cation and training programs styled after those of Germany and France, used their manuals, employed German and French instructors, individually and in missions, armed themselves with equipment from Krupp, Schneider, Hotchkiss et al., and ended up aping the organization, administration and doctrine of Germany and France during the half century between 1890 and the outbreak of World War II As this writer has pointed out already, in two cases the influences of professionalization by Europeans went much further than military training 2 . Whereas it is probably true that the essentially military results of European influence were negligible by world standards, the extramilitary ramifications were widespread. This was true for a number of reasons, among which were a long standing political tradition among military men, the persistent weakness of civilian political institutions, and an increased propensity for political action because of advances in military organization and technology unrivaled at the time in civilian sectors.
For some time now it has been assumed that military professionalization did not adiieve the desired results, (i. e., depoliticization), in Latin America because of indigenous social, economic and political factors. But indigenous factors may constitute the least important reason for the failure of professionalization to preclude political activities by the military in Latin America. Belief in this as a reason is supportive of a value judgement that "professional" military organizations do not take part in politics and government. The most significant results of fifty years of European military influence and training of South American armies was stimulation rather than lessening of political interest, and motivation of elitist, professional army offi- cers to assume responsibility for the conduct of national affairs when they became convinced that civilians were incapable. This is not meant to be a monocausal interpretation; it is, rather, an additional explanation for military interest in the politics of certain countries.
Abstention from politics certainly did not result from professionalization, despite the fact that this was the rationale in some countries for European training. What did develop first was a state which can be called military professionalism, and more. For the end of military professionalism 8 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru during the first half of this century was professional militarism: a set of attitudes which may result in the resort to political action in an attempt to find solutions for social and economic distresses by methods based on a military ethos.
A careful historical examination of the professional armies selected by South American military leaders and statesmen to be models for their own armies indicates that they in fact were highly political. The French and German armies were highly political, not in the sense that they intervened in the affairs of the state time and time again, but in the sense that they were professions, corporate entities, immune in theory but not, sadly, in practice from civilian meddling. And they were loyal to the state and the nation more than to a specific government or administration. They were vital and potent ingredients of the political process in France and Germany at the same time they were involved in the training of Latin America's armies.
While the histories of the German and French armies from, say 1871 to 1914, and then from 1918 to about 1940, are those of a high degree of professionalism, they are also histories in which partisan political issues were of vital importance to the military profession per se. To review the political ramifications of the Dreyfus Affair, the Catholic-Radical-Masonic conflict, the catastrophe of 1914 to 1915 and mutiny of 1917 in France; or the German Army and the Empire, the Kapp Putsch, the Truppenamt and the military's relations with National Socialism would be redundant here. It is sufficient to say that history has yet to record more politicized armies than those of pre-World War II France and Germany. It can be tentatively posited that Latin Americans who learned their military science in the classroom, in war games and on maneuvers learned other things from their mentors. If the French and Germans were exemplary in a professional way they cannot have been less exemplary in an extra-professional way.
European military influences -professional and extra-professional -were most keenly felt in those South American countries.where the military build-up was a facet of traditional international rivalries on the one hand, and a component of the overall modernization process on the other hand between 1890 and 1940. By 1914 German missions and individual instructors were training the armies of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile 4 . Chileans, who had studied under the retired German Captain Emil Körner (who rose to the, rank of general in Chile) and his cohorts, in turn laid the foundations for the modern armies of Colombia, Ecuador and El Salvador. Cadets and young officers from Central America, Venezuela and Paraguay studied in Santiago. German-trained Argentines were prominent in that country's army by 1914, and students from Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru came to study in Buenos Aires. Colonel Hans Kundt, probably the best known of all German officers in Latin America put in several fruitful years prior to 1914 at the military school in La Paz, Bolivia. He would later prepare and lead that country's army to disaster in the Chaco War.
The Peruvian army was under French influence through a series of missions from 1896 until 1940, except for the 1914-1918 interim. And, in 1919, a French mission led by General Maurice Gamelin, later commander-in-chief of the French Army, was contracted by Brazil. With the exception of those of the countries in the Caribbean area under heavy United States influence, no Latin American army was without an attachment to French, German (and in certain specialized fields, Spanish, Swiss or Italian), influence during the half century before World War II.
In those countries most heavily influenced by French or German military training, the armies were intensely political, in a professional sense and for professional reasons, as early as 1920, and by no later than 1930. Added to the incredible difficulties of shattered e-conomies, disrupted commercial patterns, politicai disharmony and social ferment in the interwar years was the rise of the professional military as a political interest group. By the end of 1930 Argentina, Brazil and Peru were under army-led or created regimes. Chile was entering its sixth year of military-influenced rule. Bolivia was girding for war; so was the French trained Paraguayan army.
In a recent essay one of Argentina's most distinguished generals defined the historical role of the Argentine army as being indentified with all national problems and objectives, being an integral part of Argentina's society, and being an indispensable progenitor of development 5 . While the focus of his essay was on post-1966 problems, nothing he said was unique for an Argentine general with even rudimentary political interest. Moreover none of his general remarks and attitudes differed theoretically from the attitudes and remarks of Argentine officers of a half century ago. The same could be said for present day Brazilian and Peruvian professional military attitudes.
Decidedly the point is not that French and German influence or attitudes are prevalent today, but that they shaped the general contours of mid and late 20th century civil-military relations by being infused into developing professional armies at critical developmental stages. The potential danger of such an assumption is that it may lead to a conclusion that present day military missions and advisory groups play the same role, and that, therefore, the extra-professional activities of the present-day Latin American armies -those of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Bolivia come to mind all too readily -can be traced to present outside influences.
Such is not the case, for contemporary attitudes are essentially those of a profession-with a half century of consistency regarding a sociopolitical function and regarding economic development -applied to present day situations. The development of the military profession in the major Latin American countries came about decades ago under French and German influences. Strike away those influences and leave only modern (imitative of that considered most advanced or successful) and professional organizations alone, and the results would perhaps be much the same. But the fact remains that it was indeed "the cream of the Frendi General Staff" 6 and numerous accomplished German officers who did their jobs so well that their creations became politically more powerful as institutions than ever before in countries where civilian politics became unstable.
No later than the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 the major armies of South America had assumed firm positions regarding "the civil imperative"
7 , that is the maintenance of internal security and order. Fulfillment of the civil imperative based on an ethos resulting from professional militarism may be the most important motivational force behind military participation in Latin American politics. Domestic order and internal security are prerequisites to institutional and professional progress and stability. Without the former (still hard to come by in Latin America) the latter is in danger.
The integrity of the profession and professional expertise were supposed to have been guaranteed through professionalization by consent of civilian authority, but they were not. Thus as early as the end of World War I members of the professional officer corps in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru (and Bolivia and Paraguay to a lesser extent), blamed social disorder, economic collapse and professional shortcomings on civilians and their politics. In doing so they often displayed attitudes assimilated from France and Germany.
In the two decades bracketed by the end of one world war and the beginning of another, South American armies under European tutelage were the most modern and developed sectors of society. From the standpoint of organization and cohesion they were certainly more solid than any civilian socio-economic counterpart. While it has been pointed out in numerous sources that cohesiveness of the officer corps is always at best tenuous and can decrease as political activity increases, the integrity and the progress of their profession held officers togetherjbetter than members of any similar group. Thus despite conflicts between young and old, "Europeanized" and traditional, and the myriad of inter-and intra-service rivalries, the officer class was comparatively solid. This should not imply that the officer class was monolithic but that in the social, political and economic maelstrom that was Latin America during the inter-war years, it appears that it was more stable than civilian groups. That stability, tempered and affected by internal schism and debate, was responsible for military political action taking on an increasingly professional, institutional tone and casting off personalist approaches.
In "The Ancient City" Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges wrote that, "the social and political state of a nation is always in accord with the nature and composition of its army" 8 . He was not, obviously, writing of Latin America, rather of Greece and Rome, but his maxim does convey a nineteenth century concept that appealed to South American officers who studied and trained with Europeans or in Europe: the concept that the military profession was advanced while the rest of society was backward. Owing part to European missions, by 1920 in the major Latin American countries there were European style obligatory military service laws, salary scales, retirement systems, promotion schedules, systematic training, specialized courses, and rewards based on merit, not connections. The important point here is that while much of this was "guaranteed in writing", theory and practice were far apart, and if this was so, military men would reason, it was because something was amiss in politics and society 1 Therefore, professionals -many were "young officers" -suffered from a many faceted dilemma.
Having been Europeanized, they aped their mentors by holding themselves above the rest of society and by considering themselves superior to their non-Europeanized commanders. They were, they believed, models of modernity and members of a truly modern, national institution. We know this is true in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. As junior officers in these countries rose to positions of influence they naturally favored alternate political systems or organizations which might guarantee them the prerequisites for professional progress.
The officer corps dilemma, such as it was, was heightened in South America as post-1871 techniques, doctrine, tactics and strategy were taught to aspiring officiers in Argentina, Chile and Peru. It was exacerbated after 1918 when Peruvians, and Brazilians too, benefited from the newly-regained prestige of their French instructors, successful in World War I, and when German-oriented Argentines and Chileans had to swallow their pride. Hence, in addition to political or generational differences, there was potential conflict within the officer corps based on French or German military orientation. This may be a significant motivational factor during the inter-war years. In Peru and Argentina no major French vs. German conflict developed; in Brazil and Chile it did somewhat. Significantly in the former, where Franco-German conflict did not develop, personalistic militarism lasted well into the post 1945 period. In the latter, where it did, resultant internal schisms may have influenced and moderated political action to a higher degree. Case studies of the nature of professional militarism are more illustrative.
As evidence of these cumulative effects of European training, the case of Brazil can be singled out stressed original thinking, improvisation, practicality and individuality within and without the classroom, so that the officer corps became a type of microcosm of Brazilian variables. Regionalism, a Brazilian constant, was also a facet of professional militarism. Professionally the army was advanced and solid, a bulwark of the New State, and generator of national development; internally it was flexible and divided sufficiently to weaken its ability and willingness to act politically as anything other than mediator until very recently. Today, despite the wishful thinking of such leaders as General Aurelio de Lyra Tavares 1T , we know it as yet to be far from monolithic. Another facet of the professional military dilemma alluded to above was the belief that the army -while morally and intellectually superior-was still a part of society, a "national" institution. This is true of all armies mentioned herein, but especially so, and earliest, in the case of the Chilean army 18 . There the result of Prussianization, begun in 1886, was the creation of a modern military organization with remarkable discipline. As in Brazil, however, there existed conflicts within the officer corps 19 and a definite hostility towards civilian politics shared curiosly by members of the senior and junior officer's groups. By 1920 at the latest, the army officers corps was enmeshed in partisan issues, and four years later, with Chilean politics in a near anarchic state, army officers took political matters into their own hands. Military rule in the name of national solidarity, economic development, and social progress and order was established in 1924, and lasted (in various forms) in Chile until late 1932. When Chilean officers undertook to solve national problems, the officer corps was by no means united, for by 1918 the German army had proved to be composed of mortals! Too, Germany was forbidden to sponsor official military missions and discouraged from allowing officers to go abroad as training supervisors by virtue of the Versailles accords. In addition, anti-military feeling generated from political involvements in an abortive conspiracy of 1919 and in an ill-timed mobilization in 1920, resulted in divisive attacks on the army, both before and after its overt political experiences. French military doctrine rivalled German influence (more so than in Argentina) and inter-and intra-service rivalries were evident 20 . A few Chilean officers hat attended the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre and had qualified for the Prendi General Staff by the mid 1920's. Ongoing researdi will hopefully show that anti-militarism as well as the wearing away of the luster of German orientation (but never to the point where it disappeared!) and the attractiveness of French training subtly influenced the way in which political officers conducted themselves between 1924 and 1932, particularly during the political rise of Colonel Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (President 1927-31) . Further, the diminution of direct German influence may have aided the dilution of army efforts to maintain a favored position in the 1930's. In concert with other factors it helped eradicate military personalism which briefly and with difficulty had held sway during the rise, rule and fall of Ibáñez del Campo.
In Chile and Brazil, European orientation had both comparable and contrasting results. First, French or German training tended to shape and solidify the "profession" but did not make it monolithic by any means. Second, political motivation and action were tempered to the point where the status of the profession can be considered both causal of and inhibitive to flagrant overthrow of a fragile civilian regime and/or system. Third, both armies were led by elitist officers who believed they represented the only true national instiEpstein, cited in note 1, pp. 130-135, notes the efforts of General Hans von Kiesling, who migrated to Chile, to preserve German influence there after Germany's defeat in 1919. Significantly, no Chilean sources ever consulted by the writer mention Kiesling, except in reference to his career. Similarly, little if any space in official Chilean sources is devoted to French influences aside from frequent references to Lyautey's theories during the 1930's.
tutions -impartial, apolitical (non-partisan), pure and morally superior to civilian interest groups. Fourth, virtually all professional shortcomings were blamed on civilians: the "impotent" Old Republic in Brazil and the "irresponsible" Parliamentary Republic in Chile. Fifth, it is entirely possible that Franco-German professional "differences of opinion" kept political action from taking on a personalist tone: in Chile the appeal of Ibañismo was more pronounced among civilians than among military men; in Brazil the officer class spawned no manda chuva after the demise of Marshal Hermes in 1923. To be sure, there are civilian "corollaries'' to each of these assumptions which should not be overlooked in an overall assessment of civil-military relations.
Among the major Latin American nations (excluding Mexico), Brazil and Chile are among the few held up as historically exemplary in the field of civil-military relations until recently. Not until 1964 did the Brazilian armed forces, led by the army, actually overthrow a government with the idea of holding on to power. Even then the maintenance of power was debated fiercely within the services for some months. After 1932 the Chilean army refrained from such conduct, and except for isolated and unsuccessful movements in 1935, 1938, 1939, 1945-1946, 1953-1955, and 1969 it stayed "in the barracks" unti! the overthrow of Salvador Allende. Here one might tentatively posit that professionalization achieved its objective purposes, at least until 1964 in Brazil, and between 1932 and 1973 in Chile. Obviously the existence or lack of strong national civilian political or socio-economic groups is a factor. But the fact remains that owing heavily to European training and orientation the armies of these two nations became more capable of being intensely political during the inter-war years for professional reasons. The nature of their political action was molded by environment as well, but their propensity for it was and is an inheritance based on their early 20th century experiences. This is also the case in Argentina and Peru; but inherited and environmental factors vary despite apparent similarities. German military training in Argentina, like Chile, was a pre-1914 phenomenon, but there the army was successful in eventually casting off the stigma of Germany's defeat by virtue of having asserted earlier that it was quite capable of continuing the professionalization process on its own. Nevertheless, German instructors found their way to Argentina after World War I, Versailles notwithstanding. Also, the favored position of the army under General Julio A. Roca (President, 1880-1886, 1898-1904), then its politicization at the hands of Hipólito Irigoyen (President, 1916 (President, -1922 (President, and 1928 (President, -1930 ) was unequaled at the time in South America 8I .
Argentines perpetuated the outlook of the pre-World War I German officer class themselves, and in a roughly similar milieu. Like their counterparts in Brazil, Chile and Peru, Argentine military elitists were highly critical of civilian politics, particularly during the Radical Era (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) . Unlike their counterparts, the Argentine army officers functioned within a cult of personalism, exaggerated by then extant Latin American professional military standards and akin to personalism à la Seeckt and Hindenburg. Generals Agustín P. Justo and José G. Uriburu represented the polarities of military factionalism in the inter-war years. Uriburu represented the continuation of German military orientation fused with chauvinistic Argentine and Fascist elitist ideas. Justo associated himself with the AntiPersonalist Radical faction. Despite factionalism, though, the military attitude toward civilian politics retained an essentially authoritarian, elitist character in Argentina from World War I through and beyond the Perón years (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) 24 . This, when coulped with professional attitudes toward military needs, soon took the form of army demands made in public for a national program to support mass mobilization (with two fronts always in mind!); then when war appeared improbable from 1904 on, became a demand for industrialization and economic development, not for the sake of making war but as a prerequisite to overall national greatness.
In 1907 Lieutenant Colonel Uriburu became director of the staff school Two years later Uriburu went to Germany to study. When he returned to Buenos Aires he rose quickly to the rank of Division General and ultimately became President in 1930.
Throughout those years, Uriburu personified the Germanophile. But it is conceivable that even had he not, other Argentine officers subjected to German training (both at home and in Germany itself) would have become important in the influential pressure group that was the army by 1930. Highly nationalistic, hypersensitive about military preparedness in neighbor nations and extremely critical of any prolonged debate on military matters in congress, Argentine army officers "nationalized" the elitist notions of their former men- Indeed, they sparked the army to seek to remedy Argentina's illnesses (according to professional military diagnosis and professional military therapy), in 1930 when Uriburu put forth his plan for a corporate state. Further, elitist military attitudes, "nationalized" by the 1940's lay behind the rise of the GOU and Colonel Juan D. Perón. German-influenced Argentine army officers were well aware of the failings of the democratic system in their country. While they no longer seriously contemplated war, they did believe that professional progress was inhibited by civilian politics; civilian politics of which they were not lamentably, they thought, a fundamental part. Authoritarianism with the military as full political partner appealed to their elitist notions. Argentinidad, a dominant position in the Cono Sur and aspirations to South American leadership were military values as well as those of civilian nationalists and superpatriots. Disgust for party politics and a military position of antiimperialism also had their roots in the years when the paso ganso was introduced in Buenos Aires. That certain national aspirations had not been realized and that party politics after 1955 reverted to pre-1930 patterns, have not kept army officers from their purpose.
In varying proportions, then, ideas of moral superiority and purity, the concept of a national institution "or a school of citizenship" and elitist authoritarian mentality in the armies of the ABC countries were shaped by European training and influence. Another potential effect of the development of professional armies in those countries manifested itself most clearly in Peru (and since 1964 quite clearly in Brazil) 27 . That was the view that the military was an At the beginning of the 20th century Peru, like Argentina and Brazil, was an unintegrated nation. Geographically and socially Peru was divided, and from the earliest stages of French military indoctrination the army officer corps looked upon itself as the agency most capable of bringing the country together.
After the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) Peru was not only lacking integration and unity, it was in political and economic collapse. Chile had eclipsed Peru as the leading Pacific power of the continent and had begun the military reform program under German leadership in order to maintain that position "by reason or force" -the motto in the Chilean escutcheon.
Peru's contracting of a mission in 1896, like Argentina's resort to German training, was primarily in response to the Chilean military buildup. The Peruvian government, however, did not look to Germany for assistance, but to France. France had suffered defeat at the hands of the Germans, to be sure, but the reorganization of the French army in the 1880's impressed the decision makers in Lima. Furthermore the French army, owing to a large number of Catholic and Monarchist officers, was removed, or so it appeared, from politics. French expertise in fortification, frontier defense and military engineering appealed to Lima. Forswearing any military designs on lost territory, Peru sought to apply French defensive doctrines to her own situation. In 1896 Captain Paul Clément was appointed a Colonel in the Peruvian army and took up his duties as instructor, inspector and reorganizer. Some 75 French officers served in Peru between Clément's arrival and 1940. Until the 1920's the French had great freedom in reorganizing the Peruvian army, but like the Germans in Argentina held no command positions.
Revealing much about the army he hoped to renovate, one of the first things Clément called for was a rigid promotion system that would allow only academy graduates to rise above the rank of subteniente (second lieutenant). This became law in 1899, but unfortunately for discipline was not rigidly applied. Other French-inspired proposals, dating in many cases from 1899, presaged by a half century proposals emanating from the now quarter century old, elite Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM), In his report of 1899, for example, Clément noted that frontiers must be accessible from the capital in time of peace as well as war, that internal lines of communication would aid the development of national unity as well as defense. He further stated that regionalism necessitated a flexibility in training, armament, tactics and strategy; and that the officer class should seek close association with civilians 28 . These are themes reiterated time and again in this century.
Clément also suggested that staff officers serving in the provinces should study the history, economy, politics and society of their region in order to know all possible in case an emergency arose 29 . "Peru has not one topographic map," he wrote, "not even of the area surrounding Lima." "It will be the army's job to supply one" so . Just above his signature to the 75 page 1899 report are the words, "Throughout the country, one can sense the desire to see the army move ahead along the road to progress and obtain the prestige that corresponds to the military profession." For nearly forty years Peruvian cadets, staff aspirants, and colonels who attended special advanced courses (which ultimately evolved into CAEM) had a steady dose of such heady stuff 31 .
Neither Clément nor those who came after him were able to make the army immune to political issues and pressures. But because of their pervasive influence there existed no apparent divisions within the officer corps on professional issues, save those emanating from the old vs. young rivalry.
Unlike their Brazilian counterparts, however, Peruvian political officers, Colonel Luis Sánchez Cerro for example, appealed in a personalistic way to civilians as well as army officers. This lasted well into the second half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, French emphasis on territorial unification and the awareness of having to deal with a large aboriginal population, based on French experiences in Africa and Indo-China (here again the lessons of Galliern and Lyautey should be obvious), laid groundwork for the emergence of the technocratic nation builders of the 1%0's. In an article published in 1933 Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Moria Concha wrote of the misión civilizadora of the army in Peru where he thought nationhood had yet to flourish. Transportation, communications, education and health programs for Indian conscripts, patriotism and discipline, and national economic development could all be provided by army service, and supervised by the officer corps, he concluded Early in this century, therefore, Peruvian army officers saw themselves as nation builders in a backward and divided land. Based on published materials in military journals and given the emphasis on French training it is possible to trace the origins of the present Peruvian mentalidad militar described by Victor Villanueva^to French influences. Army officers today readily cite the French emphasis on communications in remote areas, frontier defense and flexible organization in the provinces as contributory to the assumption of political responsibility. CAEM, which since 1950 has turned out a number of "intellectual officers", is a direct result of French emphasis on continued education for high ranking officers, just as is Brazil's Escola Superior de Guerra, source of the socalled "Sorbonne Officers."
Examined together, Argentina and Peru appear superficially dissimilar rather than similar. But in more detail the similarities are evident. First, personalism continued in both armies despite professionalization and because of early politicalization. In both countries the "military modernization" issue was hotly debated in civilian circles and much published material exists which is highly critical of the alleged need for a modern military; defense of the profession by civilians did not go unrewarded in times of national crisis.
Second, both Peru and Argentina originally sought European missions out of fear, Chile being the immediate danger, so they thought, from about 1885 until 1905. Once the heavy emphasis on war subsided, though, the profession did not wither. Instead, in both countries the professional army became a political pressure group with its own mission: national integration, education, nationalization of indigenous and immigrant conscripts and overseer of internal economic development.
Third, the army became hostile to the civilian center-left. In Argentina some professional officers blamed the Radicals for the lack of military progress towards professionalism, but others were co-opted by that party. The end result was the smashing of traditional civilian institutions, perhaps beyond repair. The disenchantment with Peronismo-labor politics is a continuance of this attitude in Argentina. In Peru the army became anti-Apnsta, primarily as Luigi Einaudi says, "based on the perception of APRA as 'another unreliable civilian political entity'and because of Aprista attempts to subvert military discipline. Finally, the status of the profession tempered political activities less in Argentina and Peru than in Brazil and Chile, as long as European influences were prevalent. As with Brazil and Chile, these conclusions do not stand alone and cannot be separated entirely from civilian influences.
Because of the nature of civilian politics, and owing to the socioeconomic dilemma, European-trained Argentines and Peruvians did become political, but perhaps less for professional reasons than in Brazil and Chile, until World War II. This may be because of politicalization, and the fact that civilians sought out military allies and promised them much more in Argentina and Peru than they did in Brazil and Chile. Professional training by Europeans plus the environmental factors helped to make involvement of the profession more a constant until 1940, in Argentina and Peru than in Brazil and Chile.
This essay has purposely been structured loosely, in the broadest of terms, and doubtless there may be cavils arising from points emphasized in case studies. This structuring has been purposeful in order to lay bare the subject as much as possible within the confines of an essay. It also results from work with varying types of official source materials representative of four countries. Admittedly the Argentina-Peru, Brazil-Chile pairings may not be desirable from all aspects. Nevertheless the subject lends itself to much speculation along multinational, regional lines in South America (and Europe as well). It raises many questions that cannot be answered here S5 .
In For the most part those Europeans who trained Latin Americans were outstanding officers, but the path to advancement was blocked for many owing to social and political prejudices. Many Germans who spent long years in Latin America, Körner and Kundt for example, were not Prussians or members of the aristocracy. They were idolized in Chile and Bolivia. Some of the French who served in Peru prior to 1914 were conservative, Catholic aristocrats. The politics of the Third Republic exerted great pressures on them, and they opted for foreign service. Post-1918 "military missionaries" from France escaped a sclerotic senior officer corps and boring garrison duty in the French provinces (or dangerous assignments in the colonies).
The Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean and Peruvian officers who spent time in France or Germany, and Spain and Italy also, after academy and staff training at home, rose to elite status rapidly upon their return. Uriburu, Klinger, Leitäo de Carvalho, the Chileans Bartolomé Blanche and Marmaduke Grove, and even the Peruvian Luis Sán-chez Cerro owed much to their French or German training. Many officers in the present day armies of those countries readily acknowledge European influences as critical to the development of their profession.
Marshal José Félix Estigarribia of Paraguay, who directed the Chaco campaign for his country, had studied in Chile and in France at the Ecole Supérieure. Without a doubt his French staff training made him a national figure in remote, backward Paraguay. Too, the Bolivian-Paraguayan conflict known as the Chaco War would have come about, but European training of both armies helped shape that conflict once hostilities did break out.
In summary, nearly all armies in Latin America were influenced in some ways by European training in the first half of this century. Six of South America's ten countries (Bolivia and Paraguay in addition to those treated herein) had significant military missions or instructors. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru the contracting of French or German missions was part of the overall modernization process, continental power politics and military rivalry. War-making potential was minimal, nevertheless, with the exception of the Bolivia-Paraguay conflict. But the European influence on military activities in other spheres was great. Military professionalism in a developing Latin America was also affected by civilian meddling, financial limitations, human resources and political instability; but the concept of professional integrity and status was very real. The concept stimulated, rather than precluded, political action in the manner we have called professional militarism. The history of European military influence and of the development of the military profession in South America is not simply a quaint facet of military history. It is an integral part of the sociopolitical and economic development of Latin America in the interwar years. From the beginning, European military influence and training was a hot political issue in civilmilitary relations. This compromised professional integrity and helped to make the profession into a political interest group. Nowhere was the professional officer corps a monolith, but where the highest degree of professionalism existed, its integrity and progress tended to weaken military personalism. Personalism persisted where competing European influences were not prevalent, as well as for other reasons.
Early stresses on national defense legitimized the modern military organizations. When the possibility of war diminished, military goals and values were metamorphosed into national issues. Internal security, development of human and natural resources, national unification, civic action and a "civilizing mission" resulted. Where politics or economic vicissitudes precluded such activities the army became hostile to certain (in some cases all) civilian political groups and professional militarism -an essentially European-influenced phenomenon -became the vehicle for military political action. While it is impossible to study civil-military relations from the military standpoint alone, the military must be studied as painstakingly as the social, political, economic and cultural matrix of which it is a part. Any historical study of the military profession or civilmilitary relations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru is incomplete without a thorough treatment of European military influence on the development of professional militarism.
